A natural account of phenomenal consciousness by Velmans, Max
Velmans, Max. 2005. A natural account of phenomenal consciousness. NeuroQuantology, 3(3),
pp. 164-179. [Article]
http://research.gold.ac.uk/26184/
The version presented here may differ from the published, performed or presented work. Please
go to the persistent GRO record above for more information.
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact
the Repository Team at Goldsmiths, University of London via the following email address:
gro@gold.ac.uk.
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated. For
more information, please contact the GRO team: gro@gold.ac.uk
NeuroQuantology 2005 |Issue 3|Page 164-179  
Velmans, M. A Natural Account of Phenomenal Consciousness 










Physicalists commonly argue that conscious experiences are nothing more than 
states of the brain, and that conscious qualia are observer-independent, physical 
properties of the external world. Although this assumes the ‘mantle of science,’ it 
routinely ignores the findings of science, for example in sensory physiology, 
perception, psychophysics, neuropsychology and comparative psychology. 
Consequently, although physicalism aims to naturalise consciousness, it gives an 
unnatural account of it. It is possible, however, to develop a natural, nonreductive, 
reflexive model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world. 
This paper introduces such a model and how it construes the nature of conscious 
experience. Within this model the physical world as perceived (the phenomenal 
world) is viewed as part of conscious experience not apart from it. While in 
everyday life we treat this phenomenal world as if it is the "physical world", it is 
really just one biologically useful representation of what the world is like that may 
differ in many respects from the world described by physics. How the world as 
perceived relates to the world as described by physics can be investigated by 
normal science (e.g. through the study of sensory physiology, psychophysics and 
so on). This model of consciousness appears to be consistent with both 
third-person evidence of how the brain works and with first-person evidence of 
what it is like to have a given experience. According to the reflexive model, 
conscious experiences are really how they seem.  
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here are many differences of opinion about how to define consciousness. This 
uncertainty about how to define consciousness is partly brought about by the way 
global theories about consciousness (or even about the nature of the universe) have 
intruded into definitions. For example, "substance dualists" such as Plato, Descartes, and 
Eccles believe the universe to consist of two fundamental kinds of stuff, material stuff and the 
stuff of consciousness (a substance associated with soul or spirit). "Property dualists" such as 
Sperry and Libet take consciousness to be a special kind of property that is itself 
nonphysical, but which emerges from physical systems such as the brain once they attain a 
T 
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certain level of complexity. By contrast, "reductionists" such as Crick (1994) and Dennett 
(1991), believe consciousness to be nothing more than a state or function of the brain. 
Within cognitive psychology, there are many proposals which identify consciousness with 
some aspect of human information processing, for example with working memory, focal 
attention, a central executive, and so on. 
Fortunately, definitions need not be final for research to get under way. It is enough 
that, for given investigative purposes, definitions are sufficiently similar for different 
investigators to be able to agree that they are investigating the same thing. As science begins 
to unravel the causes of consciousness, the functions of consciousness, how consciousness 
relates to nonconscious processing in the brain and so on, our understanding of what 
consciousness is will deepen - for the reason that such relationships form part of the 
meaning of the term (its connotative meaning, or sense). Such mutual focusing of attention 
followed by exploration of the nature of what is attended to (and how it relates to other 
things) is fundamental to how phenomena come to be understood in a socially shared way. 
In this respect, coming to understand the nature of consciousness is no different to coming 
to understand the nature of anything else.  
Nevertheless, before any investigation can begin, one has to "point to" or "pick out" the 
phenomena to which the term refers and, by implication, what is excluded. In everyday life 
there are two contrasting situations which inform our understanding of the term 
"consciousness". We have knowledge of what it is like to be conscious (when we are awake) 
as opposed to not being conscious (when in dreamless sleep). We also understand what it is 
like to be conscious of something (when awake or dreaming) as opposed to not being 
conscious of that thing. This everyday understanding provides a simple place to start. A 
person, or other entity, is conscious if they experience something; conversely, if a person or 
entity experiences nothing they are not conscious. Elaborating slightly, we can say that when 
consciousness is present, phenomenal content is present. Conversely, when phenomenal 
content is absent, consciousness is absent. This stays very close to everyday usage and, for 
this paper, it is all that we need. To minimise confusion, I will also stay as close as possible to 
everyday, natural language usage for related terms. In common usage, the term 
"consciousness" is often synonymous with "awareness" or "conscious awareness." 
Consequently, I will use these terms interchangeably." The "contents of consciousness" 
encompass all that we are conscious of, aware of, or experience. These include not only 
experiences that we commonly associate with ourselves, such as thoughts, feelings, images, 
dreams, body sensations and so on, but also the experienced three-dimensional world (the 
phenomenal world) beyond the body surface.  
Of course, to learn what something is, it is useful in the initial instance to know where 
it is, so that one can point to it - enabling the attention of different investigators to be 
focused upon it. But where does one point, when one is pointing at phenomenal 
consciousness?  
 
Where dualists and reductionists think consciousness to be 
According to Descartes the material world is composed of res extensa, a substance that has 
both location and extension in space. Consciousness is formed out of res cogitans a 
substance which thinks, but which has no location or extension in space. If this is right, then 
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one cannot point at consciousness, as it has no location. At best, one might be able to point 
at the place where consciousness interfaces with the material world. According to Descartes 
this is at the pineal gland located in the centre of the brain. Physicalist and functionalist 
philosophers (e.g. Searle 1992; Dennett 1991) argue that consciousness is nothing more than 
a state or function of the brain. It might be difficult to point with any precision at such states 
or functions as they are likely to be distributed properties of large neuronal populations (cf 
Dennett & Kinsbourne 1992). Nevertheless, if one had to point one would point at the 
brain. In short, classical dualists and reductionists disagree vehemently about what conscious 
is, but they agree (roughly) about where it is. In so far as consciousness can be located at all, 
that location is somewhere in the brain. 
 
A common-sense view of conscious phenomenology 
In Velmans (1990, 2000) I have argued that this currently popular view has no basis either in 
science or in everyday experience. In order to decide where consciousness is (or whether it 
has any location) one has to attend to its actual phenomenology. It is true that there are 
some experiences which seem to be poorly localised in space, or at best localised 
somewhere in the head or brain, just as dualists and reductionists claim. Examples include 
thoughts and vague feelings such as the verbal thoughts, feelings of understanding and so on 
that accompany the reading of this text. However, most experiences have a very different 
phenomenology, for example experiences of the body or of the external world.  
Let me illustrate with a very simple example. Suppose you stick a pin in your finger and 
experience a sharp pain. Within philosophy of mind pain is generally regarded as a paradigm 
case of a conscious, mental event. But where is the pain? Hampered by their theoretical 
presuppositions, dualists and reductionists take this to be a rather difficult question. 
However, if forced to point they would point (vaguely) in the direction of the brain (see 
comments by Nagel, Harnad, Searle, Marcel, and Dennett, following Velmans 1993). I take 
this to be a very simple question. The pain one experiences is in the finger. If one had to 
point at it one should point at where the pin went in. Any reader in doubt on this issue 
might like to try it. 
Let me be clear that this sharp difference of opinion is about the experienced pain and 
not about the antecedent physical causes (the deformation and damage to the skin produced 
by the pin) or about the neural causes and correlates of pain. The proximal neural causes 
and correlates of pain are undoubtedly located in the brain. But the neural causes and 
correlates of a given experience are not themselves that experience. In science, causes and 
correlates are not ontological identities. I have given a detailed analysis of how causes and 
correlates relate to ontological identities in Velmans (1998, 2000), so I won’t labour the 
point here. 
This subjective location of pains in parts of the body rather than "nowhere" or "in the 
brain" exemplifies a general principle that leads one away from both dualism and 
reductionism towards a "reflexive" model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the 
physical world (cf Velmans 1990). In many respects, there is no difference between these 
theoretical positions. For example, dualism, reductionism and the reflexive model agree that 
there are physical and neurophysiological causes and correlates of a given experience within 
the brain - and that we can leave it to science to discover what these are. But they disagree 
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about the nature and location of the effects (the resulting experiences). Dualists claim that, 
being constructed out of res cogitans, experiences have no location or extension in space 
(although they interface with the brain). Reductionists claim that, being brain states or 
functions, all experiences must be in the brain (in spite of how they seem). According to the 
reflexive model, the only evidence about conscious phenomenology comes from first-person 
sources. Consequently, the properties of that phenomenology can only be determined from 
first-person sources. For conscious appearances, the appearance is the reality (Searle, 1992). 
Consequently, if a pain appears to be in the finger, then that is where the pain is. The 
damage produced by a pin in the finger, once it is processed by the brain, winds up as a 
phenomenal pain in the finger, located more or less where the pin went in. That is why the 
entire process is called "reflexive".  
Notice that if one stabs one’s finger with a pin, and one attends to the consequent pain 
phenomenology, one has no additional, experience of pain either "nowhere" or in the brain. 
Nor can any phenomenal pain "nowhere" or in the brain be observed by an external 
observer (from a third-person perspective only its neural causes and correlates can be 
observed). Given that there is no first- or third-person evidence for phenomenal pain 
"nowhere" or in the brain, I suggest that this is a theoretical fiction, introduced by dualist 
and reductionist thinkers in order to make their models work. Only the reflexive model is 
consistent with the evidence of common sense. 
To put the basic principle in a more general way: experiences are where we experience 
them to be. Figure 1, for example, illustrates a similar process with a phenomenal cat. As 
before, some entity or event innervates sense organs and initiates perceptual processing, 
although in this case the initiating entity is located beyond the body surface in the external 
world. As before, afferent neurons, and cortical projection areas are activated, along with 
association areas, long-term memory traces and so on, and neural representations of the 
initiating event are eventually formed within the brain - in this case, neural representations 
of a cat. But the entire causal sequence does not end there. The subject S also has a visual 
experience of a cat and, as before, we can ask what this experience is like. In this case, the 
proper question to ask is, "What do you see?" According to dualism, S has a visual 
experience of a cat "in her mind". According to reductionists there seems to be a 
phenomenal cat "in S’s mind" but this is really nothing more than a state of her brain. 
According to the reflexive model, while S is gazing at the cat, her only visual experience of 
the cat, is the cat she sees out in the world. If she is asked to point to this phenomenal cat 
(her "cat experience"), she should point not to her brain but to the cat as-perceived, out in 
space beyond the body surface. In this, S is no different from an external observer E. The cat 
as perceived by S is the same cat as perceived by E (albeit viewed from S's perspective 
rather than from E's perspective). That is, an entity in the world is reflexively experienced to 
be an entity in the world.  
Of course, not all the entities and events we experience have such a clear location and 
extension in three-dimensional phenomenal space. We also have "inner" experiences such as 
verbal thoughts, images, feelings of knowing, experienced desires and so on. Such inner 
experiences really do seem to have a phenomenology of the kind that characterise 
Descartes’ res cogitans. One might argue that verbal thoughts have a rough location, in that 
they seem to be "in the head" (in the form of inner speech) rather than in one’s foot, or 
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free-floating out in space, but they are not clearly located in the manner of pains and cats. 
However, the reflexive process is the same. The cognitive processes which give rise to 
thoughts, feelings of knowing and so on originate in the mind/brain, although these processes 
are unlikely to have a precise location in so far as they engage the mass action of large, 
distributed, neuronal populations. Consequently, in so far as these processes are 
experienced, they are reflexively experienced to be roughly where they are (in the head or 
brain).  
There is far more to be said about conscious phenomenology and its relation to the 
brain and physical world. But, if I am right so far, even a cursory examination of what we 
actually experience poses a fundamental challenge to dualist and reductionist 
presuppositions about what it is that they need to explain. Both dualism and reductionism 
assume experiences to be quite different from the perceived body and the perceived 
external world (perceived bodies and worlds are out-there in space, while experiences of 
bodies and worlds are "nowhere" or in the brain). But the reflexive model suggests that in 
terms of phenomenology there is no actual separation between the perceived body and 
experiences of the body or between the perceived external world and experiences of that 
world. It goes without saying that when one has a conscious thought, there isn’t some 
additional experience of a thought "in the mind". But neither is there a phenomenal pain "in 
the mind" (without location and extension) in addition to the pain one experiences in the 
finger if one stabs it with a pin. And there isn’t a phenomenal cat "in the mind" in addition to 
the cat one sees out in the world. Applying Occam’s razor, the reflexive model gets rid of 
them.  
 
Figure 1. A Reflexive Model of Perception 
 
NeuroQuantology 2005 |Issue 3|Page 164-179  
Velmans, M. A Natural Account of Phenomenal Consciousness 
ISSN 1303 5150  www.neuroquantology.com 
 
169 
But the reflexive model does not get rid of conscious phenomenology. Thoughts, pains 
and phenomenal cats are experienced to have very different "qualia" (along with different 
locations and extensions), but they are nevertheless aspects of what we experience. 
Together, such inner experiences, bodily sensations, and external experienced entities and 
events comprise the contents of our consciousness - which are none other than our 
everyday phenomenal world.  
 
Who else says this?  
To those immersed in dualist or reductionist modes of thought this proposed expansion of 
the contents of consciousness to include the entire phenomenal world may seem radical and 
the notion that many experiences have a precise location and extension might appear 
strange. But, thus far, this proposal is hardly new. In one or another form it appears in the 
work of George Berkeley, Immanuel Kant, C.H. Lewes, W.K. Clifford, Ernst Mach, Morton 
Prince, William James, A.N. Whitehead, Charles Sherrington, Bertrand Russell, R. Brain, 
Wolfgang Köhler and Karl Pribram. Similar analyses of what consciousness seems to be like 
have also recently been given by Antti Revonsuo and Michael Tye.  
William James (1904) for example, suggests that to convince oneself about where 
experiences are the observer only needs to  
"... begin with a perceptual experience, the 'presentation', so called, of a physical object, 
his actual field of vision, the room he sits in, with the book he is reading as its centre, 
and let him for the present treat this complex object in the commonsense way as being 
'really' what it seems to be, namely, a collection of physical things cut out from an 
environing world of other physical things with which these physical things have actual or 
potential relations. Now at the same time it is just those self-same things which his 
mind, as we say, perceives, and the whole philosophy of perception from Democritus's 
time downwards has been just one long wrangle over the paradox that what is evidently 
one reality should be in two places at once, both in outer space and in a person's mind. 
'Representative' theories of perception avoid the logical paradox, but on the other hand 
they violate the reader's sense of life which knows no intervening mental image but 
seems to see the room and the book immediately just as they physically exist".  
One insight, of course, does not make a theory. While the philosophers and scientists 
mentioned above agree that some experiences appear to have location and spatial extension, 
there is widespread disagreement about what this implies about the nature of consciousness 
and its relation to the physical world. Berkeley for example is an idealist, James a neutral 
monist, Whitehead a process theorist, and Tye, a physicalist. In Velmans (2000), I develop 
reflexive monism, an analysis of what is going on which is none of these (although it 
incorporates elements of many positions).  
It is only possible to introduce a few consequences of the reflexive model and how this 
translates into reflexive monism (a broad philosophical position) in a brief journal article. So, 
by way of introduction, I will focus here on just one fundamental issue: how it makes sense 
of conscious intentionality (that consciousness is consciousness of something). To set the 
theory in a philosophical context I will also contrast the analysis I develop with that of 
Armstrong (1968), Block (1997) and Tye (1995). 
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What do experiences represent? 
In dualism and reductionism it is easy to see what experiences of the external world 
represent. Percepts of objects "in the mind" or "in the brain" represent the objects we see 
out in the world. But, at first glance, the intentionality of conscious experiences would seem 
to be a problem for the reflexive model. If experiences of objects and objects as-perceived 
are phenomenologically identical, as argued above, then what do experiences of objects 
represent? One might ask the same question about the experienced body and about "inner" 
experiences.  
And there is a related question. According to the reflexive model, what we commonly refer 
to as the "physical world" is just the world we experience. However, this clearly remains 
very different to the world described by modern physics (the world of quantum mechanics, 
relativity theory, grand unified theory and so on). So how does the phenomenal, "physical 
world" relate to the world described by physics?  
 
A reflexive model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world 
The reflexive model shown in Figure 1 suggests that all experiences result from a reflexive 
interaction of an observer with an observed. For the purposes of illustrating how this 
interaction works to produce different kinds of experience, these can be subdivided into 
three categories:  
(1) experiences of the external world (which seem to have location and extension)  
(2) experiences of the body (which seem to have location and extension)  
(3) "inner" experiences (thoughts, images, feelings of knowing and so on) which have no 
clear location and extension in phenomenal space, although they can be loosely said to 
be "in the head or brain".  
Figure 1 illustrates one example of a reflexive interaction resulting in an experience (a 
visual percept) of a phenomenal cat. In this case, the initiating stimulus (the observed) is an 
entity located in space beyond the body surface that interacts with the visual system of the 
observer to produce an experienced entity out in space beyond the body surface. As noted 
above, a similar reflexive interaction takes place when the initiating stimulus is on the surface 
of (or within) the body, or within the brain itself to produce experienced entities and events 
on the surface of (or within) the body, or in the head or brain itself.  
What is going on? Following current conventions in the psychology of perception, I 
assume that the brain constructs a "representation" or "mental model" of what is happening, 
based on the input from the initiating stimulus, expectations, traces of prior, related stimuli 
stored in long-term memory, and so on (cf Rock, 1997). Such mental models encode 
information about the entities and events that they represent in formats determined by the 
sensory modality that they employ. Visual representations of a cat, for example, include 
encodings for shape, location and extension, movement, surface texture, colour, and so on. 
In addition, I suggest that the way information (in a given mental model) appears to be 
formatted depends on the observational arrangements. The information appears in different 
forms to the subject (S) and an external observer (E) for the reason that the means available 
to S and E for accessing the information in that mental model differ (cf Velmans, 1991).  
An external observer, inspecting a subject’s brain, has to rely on his own exteroceptive 
systems (typically vision) aided by physical equipment (PET scans, fMRI and so on). Viewed in 
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this way (from this third-person perspective) a visual mental model in the subject’s brain 
might appear in the form of neural activation in a series of relatively distinct feature maps 
distributed throughout the subject’s visual system. We do not know precisely what is 
required to make such neural representations conscious. However, given the integrated 
nature of visual experiences, it is reasonable to assume that when such distributed neural 
activities do become conscious they must be bound together in some way, perhaps through 
synchronous 40 Hz oscillations. We may also expect there to be observable (physical) 
influences on the pattern of activity embodied in the mental model from existing memory 
traces (corresponding to the effects of expectation, stored knowledge and so on). Whatever 
the fine detail turns out to be like, viewed from E’s perspective, the information (about the 
cat) in S’s mental model is likely to take a neural, or other physical form. In terms of what E 
can directly observe of S’s mental model, that is the end of the scientific story.  
However, the observational arrangement by which the subject accesses the information 
in her own mental model is entirely different. As with E, the information in her own mental 
model is translated into something that she can observe or experience - but all she 
experiences is a phenomenal cat out in the world. While she focuses her attention on the 
cat she does not become conscious of having a "mental model of a cat" in the form of neural 
states. Nor does she have an experience of a cat "in her head or brain". Rather, she become 
conscious of what the neural states represent - an entity out in the external world. In short, 
the information encoded in S’s mental model (about the entity in the world) is identical 
whether viewed by S or by E, but the way the information appears to be formatted depends 
on the perspective from which it is viewed. 
Let me illustrate with a simple analogy. Let us suppose that the information encoded in 
the subject’s brain is formed into a kind of neural "projection hologram." A projection 
hologram has the interesting property that the three-dimensional image it encodes is 
perceived to be out in space, in front of its two-dimensional surface, provided that it is 
viewed from an appropriate (frontal) perspective and it is illuminated by an appropriate 
(frontal) source of light. Viewed from any other perspective (from the side or from behind) 
the only information one can detect about the object is in the complex interference patterns 
encoded on the holographic plate. In analogous fashion, the information in the neural 
"projection hologram" is displayed as a visual, three-dimensional object out in space only 
when it is viewed from the appropriate, first-person perspective of the perceiving subject. 
And this happens only when the necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness are 
satisfied (when there is "illumination by an appropriate source of light"). Viewed from any 
other, external perspective the information in S’s "hologram" appears to be nothing more 
than neural representations in the brain (interference patterns on the plate).  
The "projection hologram" is, of course, only an analogy- but it is useful in that it shares 
some of the apparently puzzling features of conscious experiences. The information 
displayed in the three-dimensional holographic image is encoded in two-dimensional patterns 
on a plate, but there is no sense in which the three-dimensional image is itself "in the plate". 
Likewise, there is no sense in which the phenomenal cat observed by S is "in her head or 
brain." In fact, the 3-D holographic image does not even exist (as an image) without an 
appropriately placed observer and an appropriate source of light. Likewise, the existence of 
the phenomenal cat requires the participation of S, the experiencing agent, and all the 
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conditions required for conscious experience (in her mind/brain) have to be satisfied. Finally, 
a given holographic image only exists for a given observer, and can only be said to be located 
and extended where that observer perceives it to be! S’s phenomenal cat is similarly private 
and subjective. If she perceives it to be out in phenomenal space beyond the body surface, 
then, from her perspective, it is out in phenomenal space beyond the body surface.  
 
Perceptual projection 
Unconscious mind/brain processes construct experienced realities in which our phenomenal 
heads appear to be enclosed within three-dimensional, phenomenal worlds, not the other 
way around. But the mental models that encode information about these 3D experienced 
realities are "in the head or brain". Given this, how do phenomenal cats and other 
phenomenal objects that are perceived to be located and extended in space get to be out 
there? It is clear that nothing physical is projected by the brain. There are for example no 
light rays projected through the eyes to illuminate the world, contrary to the beliefs of 
ancient Greek thinkers such as Empedocles (cf Zajonc, 1993). Rather, "perceptual 
projection" is a psychological effect produced by unconscious perceptual processing. The 
projection hologram has a number of features that might be usefully incorporated into a 
causal explanation of such effects, but it is not intended to be a literal theory of what is 
taking place in the mind/brain. Right now, we just don’t know how it is done. Of course, not 
fully understanding how it happens, does not alter the fact that it happens - and the 
experimental and clinical evidence for perceptual projection is considerable. I have reviewed 
this elsewhere (in Velmans, 1990, 2000) and will not repeat that review here. Clinical and 
experimental examples include phantom limbs, hallucinations and virtual realities. A 
particularly striking example is reported by the neurologist Peter Brugger (1994) in a clinical 
case history of a17 year-old man suffering from epilepsy caused by a lesion in his left 
temporal lobe. He was being treated with anti-convulsant drugs to control the condition and 
was scheduled for surgery when he experienced an "heautoscopic" episode (a visual 
hallucination of his body combined with an out-of-body experience) which was disturbing in 
the extreme: 
"The heautoscopic episode, which is of special interest to the topic of this report, 
occurred shortly before admission. The patient stopped his phenytoin medication, drank 
several glasses of beer, stayed in bed the whole of the next day, and in the evening he was 
found mumbling and confused below an almost completely destroyed large bush just under 
the window of his room on the third floor. At the local hospital, thoracic and pelvic 
contusions were noted. The patient gave the following account of the episode: on the 
respective morning he got up with a dizzy feeling. Turning around, he found himself still lying 
in bed. He became angry about "this guy who I knew was myself and who would not get up 
and thus risked being late for work". He tried to wake the body in bed first by shouting at it; 
then by trying to shake it and then repeatedly jumping on his alter ego in the bed. The lying 
body showed no reaction. Only then did the patient begin to be puzzled about his double 
existence and become more and more scared by the fact that he could no longer tell which 
of the two he really was. Several times his body awareness switched from the one standing 
upright to the one still lying in bed; when in the lying bed mode he felt quite awake but 
completely paralysed and scared by the figure of himself bending over and beating him. His 
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only intention was to become one person again and, looking out of the window (from where 
he could still see his body lying in bed), he suddenly decided to jump out "in order to stop 
the intolerable feeling of being divided in two". At the same time, he hoped that "this really 
desperate action would frighten the one in bed and thus urge him to merge with me again". 
The next thing he remembers is waking up in pain in the hospital." (Brugger, 1994, pp 
838-839). 
In short, this patient mistakenly judged the hallucinated body on the bed to be his real 
one and tried to get rid of his real body (which he judged to be the hallucination) in order to 
become unified again - a powerful example of the constructed, projected nature of the body 
as-experienced. But we do not really need such striking examples to demonstrate that there 
is something interesting going on that needs explanation. The simple fact that this WORD 
appears to be out here on this page (rather than in your brain) illustrates that the 
phenomenon is both ubiquitous and real. 
The world as-perceived is part-of the contents of consciousness. Some initial principles 
that follow from the analysis above should now be clear. Within the reflexive model the 
physical world as-perceived is part of the contents of consciousness. The contents of 
consciousness are not in some separate place or space "in the mind or brain". That is, in 
terms of phenomenology no clear separation exists between what we normally think of as 
the "physical world", the "phenomenal world", and the "world as-perceived". That said, the 
everyday physical world as-perceived does have to be distinguished from the more abstract 
world described by physics (and other sciences). According to the reflexive model, the 
physical world as-perceived is just one, biologically useful representation of the world that 
science might describe in many alternative ways. But, with our eyes open, what we normally 
call the "physical world" just is what we experience. There is no additional experience of the 
world "in the mind or brain".  
 
How does the phenomenal, "physical world" relate to the world described by physics? In 
Velmans (2000, ch7) I give a detailed review of how the mind/brain system translates the 
energies described by physics into a world-as-experienced. I will not repeat that review 
here. Suffice it to say that the data from physics, sensory physiology, perception and 
psychophysics makes it clear that the perceived world "models" only a selection of the 
events and energies that physics describes. There are electromagnetic energies of many 
kinds that permeate space and even penetrate our bodies, to which our eyes (and other 
sense organs) are blind. There are signals produced by animals and insects to which our ears 
are deaf. Each sensory system has its own limits of resolution. Changes in light intensity of 
less than around 5% or in sound intensity of less than around 20% are not perceived as 
changes. A change in sound frequency from 1000 Hz to 1005 Hz produces a just noticeable 
rise in pitch but not a change from 4000 Hz to 4005 Hz. A change in electromagnetic 
wavelength from 480 to 481 nanometers will produce a noticeable change in hue, but not a 
change from 550 to 551 nanometers. Our sense of smell and taste monitor, but tell us little 
of the chemistry of the substances we inhale and ingest. Sensation and perception are limited 
in their spatial resolution to detect events of a size and distance that are relevant to normal 
human action and survival – beyond this we need microscopes and telescopes. Our sensory 
systems are also structured to detect events of a given duration. Light bulbs, for example, 
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actually flash 50 times per second (the frequency of the A.C. mains voltage). However, this 
"flicker frequency" is faster than the visual system can resolve which makes the light seem 
continuous. By contrast, the movement of a flower out of the earth is too slow to see, so 
one needs time-lapse photography to ‘see’ the movement. 
The data from comparative psychology, and zoology also suggests that the "physical 
reality" perceived by humans is only one of many possible perceived realities. The precise 
mix of sensory, perceptual, cognitive and social capacities in each species is unique. Human 
sensory and perceptual systems perform broadly similar functions to those of other animals. 
But the sensitivity of sense organs, the range of energies to which they are tuned, and the 
way information detected by the sensors is subject to perceptual processing vary 
considerably from species to species. Consequently, the "physical reality" that we perceive is 
actually a peculiarly human world. 
 
PHYSICALIST ACCOUNTS OF THE LOCATION OF QUALIA 
As far as I can judge, the above account of how observer-dependent, perceived phenomena 
represent an independently existing "reality" which natural science might describe in other 
ways is consistent both with science and with common sense. However the 
observer-dependence of qualia such as colour, smell, taste and so on has been strongly 
resisted by some physicalist philosophers of mind. Their resistance is a consequence of their 
commitment to physicalism. If qualia such as "redness" are, in their essence, 
observer-dependent experiences, then it is not easy to reduce such qualia to "objective" 
states of the brain, no matter how brain states are construed. Armstrong (1968), for 
example, acknowledges that unless one can exclude properties such as "redness" from 
perception he would have to abandon his entire reductive programme, which claims 
perception to be nothing more than the capacity to make certain discriminations. But 
"redness" undeniably exists, so Armstrong is forced into the view that redness is an 
observer-independent, physical property of certain physical objects. (Having excluded such 
qualia from perception there is nowhere else for them to go!)  
According to the reflexive model, colour appears only once light waves (in the visible 
waveband) have been translated by the visual system into colour experiences. That is, 
objects are only red if (a) they reflect light with the appropriate wavelengths (around 700 
nm) and (b) the visual system translates that electromagnetic energy into a red colour 
experience. Of these two conditions, (b) is the more important. That is, the visual system 
can produce a colour experience without being innervated by light in the 700 nm region (for 
example in dreams, vivid imagery, and hallucinations). But, without visual systems of the 
appropriate kind, light waves of 700 nm have no colour at all (colour as such is not an 
electromagnetic property). By contrast, Armstrong claims that objects are "red" whether or 
not there is anyone to perceive them. As van der Heijden et.al (1997) note (in their 
commentary on a similar position adopted by Block, 1995), such a view simply does not take 
the natural sciences seriously.  
"That there are colours in the external world is a naive idea, unsupported by physics, 
biology, or psychology. Ultimately, it presupposes that the representation (the perceived 
colour) is represented (as a perceived colour). A perceptual system performs its proper 
function when it distinguishes the relevant things in the outer world. For vision, the 
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information about these relevant things is contained in the structure and composition of the 
light reflected by the outer world that enters the eyes. For distinguishing the relevant things 
in the external world, a unique and consistent representation of the corresponding 
distinctions in the light is all that is required." (Van der Heijden, et al, 1997, p158). 
However, according to Block (1997), van der Heijden et.al are "wildly, unbelievably 
wrong. They say that we should give up the idea that a rose or anything else is ever red. The 
only redness, they say, is mental redness. But why not hold instead that roses are red .... 
rejecting colors in the mind? Why not construe talk of red in the mind as a misleading way 
of expressing the fact that P-conscious states represent the world as being red? And a 
representations of red need not itself be red (like the occurrences of the word "red" here)." 
(P165).  
Block is, of course, right to point out that neural representations of red roses need not 
themselves be coloured. But no one claims that they are. What is claimed is that once a 
normal, human visual system is activated in an appropriate way, a visual experience of a red 
colour will result, irrespective of whether that colour corresponds to a physical property 
out in the world. Penfield & Rasmussen (1950), for example, demonstrated that direct 
microelectrode stimulation of the visual system resulted in visual experiences, stimulation of 
the temporal lobe in auditory experiences, stimulation of the somatosensory system in 
tactile experiences, and so on. Given that such visual, auditory, and tactile qualia can exist in 
the absence of the physical properties that they normally represent, it is not easy to see how 
they can be reduced to such physical properties. 
A case for "red" and other qualia being observer-independent properties of the world 
rather than properties of experience has also recently been put by Tye (1995). Tye argues 
(as I do in Velmans, 1990) that all "qualia" are representational. He also agrees that qualia 
such as "redness" do not seem to be "in the mind or brain" but seem to be firmly attached 
to objects in the world. But he has an entirely different explanation of why the qualia seem 
to be out there. According to Tye, this results from perceptual experiences being 
transparent: 
"Why is it that perceptual experiences are transparent? When you turn your gaze 
inward and try to focus your attention on intrinsic features of these experiences, why do 
you always seem to end up attending to what the experiences are of? Suppose you have a 
visual experience of a shiny, blood-soaked dagger. Whether, like Macbeth, you are 
hallucinating or whether you are seeing a real dagger, you experience redness and shininess 
as outside you, as covering the surface of a dagger. Now try to become aware of your 
experience itself, inside you, apart from its objects. Try to focus your attention on some 
intrinsic feature of the experience that distinguishes it from other experiences, something 
other than what it is an experience of. The task seems impossible: one’s awareness seems 
always to slip through the experience to the redness and shininess, as instantiated together 
externally. In turning one’s mind inward to attend to the experience, one seems to end up 
scrutinizing external features or properties." (p135). 
To summarise, both physicalism and the reflexive model posit the existence of an 
observer-independent physical world, but they take a different view about how this relates 
to the phenomenal world (the perceived physical world). I treat the perceived "physical 
world" as part-of what we experience, and suggest that this experience is one, biologically 
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useful representation of what is really there. These representations may or may not 
correspond well to the world described by physics. For example, the perceived distance of 
experienced events represents measured distance quite well for close events, but breaks 
down completely for large distances (e.g. the perceived distance of the sun gives little 
indication of its measured distance). Perceived location, and distance result from 
preconscious, mental modelling processes involving "perceptual projection."  
According to Tye, however, inner representational states are "transparent." That is, we 
"see through" our representations of colour, smell and so on to colours and smells as they 
really are out in the world. Tye bases his case partly on how things appear to us, and partly 
on evidence that perceived qualia really do correspond quite well to properties measured by 
Physics.  
As Tye notes, "Certainly we do not experience colors as perceiver-relative. When, for 
example, a ripe tomato looks red to me, I experience redness all over the facing surface of 
the tomato. Each perceptible part of the surface looks red to me. None of these parts, in 
looking red look to me to have a perceiver-relative property. I do not experience any part 
of the surface as producing a certain sort of response in me or anyone else. On the 
contrary, I surely experience redness as intrinsic to it, just as I experience the shape of the 
surface as intrinsic to it." (p145). Given that we experience such colours as not being 
perceiver-relative, he regards the view that they are perceiver-relative as "just not credible" 
(p145).  
Given that physicalism routinely denies the reliability of appearances as a guide to what 
experiences are really like, Tye rests his case on shaky ground. There are many obvious 
counterexamples. The colours of surfaces may seem to be observer-independent, but the 
colours of after-images do not. If one stares at a red spot for a few minutes, for example, 
one will experience a green after-image that projects onto any surface that the eye fixates. 
The apparent size of the after-image also increases as the judged distance of the surface 
increases. So, if apparent, observer-dependence is to be the criterion of what is "mental", 
after-images are surely mental. The observer-dependence of colour attached to surfaces in 
the world also becomes evident once the visual system no longer functions in the normal 
way. In cases of red-green colour blindness, for example, red can no longer be distinguished 
from green – and in cases of achromatopsia the entire world appears in shades of grey! 
More fundamentally, the reason that surfaces just appear coloured (without any conscious 
contribution on our part) is due to the fact that visual processing operates preconsciously. 
That is, once visual scenes appear in conscious experience, the binding of colour with shape, 
movement and so on has already taken place! Finally, it is important to note that variations 
in how things are experienced cannot be used to decide whether or not things are 
experienced!  
Tye’s second main argument relies on evidence that in some circumstances the 
qualia/physical property correspondence may be relatively invariant. Colours remain fairly 
similar for example when viewed outdoors, indoors (illuminated by incandescent lamps), or 
through sunglasses. Tye asks, "Why should this be? Surely the most straightforward answer 
is that the human visual system has, as one of its functions, to detect the real, objective 
colors of surfaces. Somehow, the visual system manages to ascertain what colors objects 
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really have, even thought the only information immediately available to it concerns 
wavelengths." (p146) After a review of some of the relevant evidence, Tye concludes that  
"Colors are objective, physical features of objects and surfaces. Our visual systems have 
evolved to detect a range of these features, but those to which we are particularly sensitive 
are indirectly dependent on facts about us. In particular there are three types of receptor in 
the retina, each of which responds to a particular waveband of light, and the spectral 
reflectances of surfaces at those wavebands (that is, their disposition to reflect a certain 
percentage of incident light within each of the three bands) together determine the colors 
we see. So the colors themselves may be identified with ordered triples of spectral 
reflectances. An account of the same general sort may be given for smells, tastes, sounds, 
and so on." (Tye, 1995, p150) 
Tye is right to point out that the way perceived colour maps onto given patterns of 
light reflectance may be more invariant than is sometimes thought. After all, it makes 
evolutionary sense for our perceptual systems to pick out physical invariances when they 
occur and to translate these into relatively invariant experiences. However even a perfect 
correlation between perceived qualia and events described by physics would not establish 
their ontological identity (causation and correlation do not establish identity – see above). 
Indeed, physical descriptions as such do nothing to explain why one pattern of light 
reflectances should be perceived as "red," and another as "green," while a pattern of light 
reflectances in the ultra-violet region is seen as nothing at all (unless one happens to be a 
bee). Nor do physical descriptions explain the rather arbitrary way the visual system 
translates electromagnetic energies with wavelengths ordered on a ratio scale into colour 
categories ordered on a nominal scale. If our experiences simply "mirrored" the world, we 
would expect the relationships between properties described by physics to be more 
faithfully preserved in the way such relationships are experienced. To this one must add the 
many differences in the way given physical properties can be experienced both within and 
between species (see Velmans, 2000, ch 7 for a review). As van der Heijden et al (1997) 
note, the view that perceived qualia exist in the world in a way that is free of such biological 
influences simply does not take the natural sciences seriously. 
 
CONCLUSION  
Reductive physicalism rejects first-person evidence, arguing that conscious experiences are 
nothing more than states of the brain, however they might seem. Having reduced conscious 
states to brain states, they commonly try to externalise their "qualia", claiming these to be 
observer-independent, physical properties of the external world. Although reductive 
physicalism drapes itself in the ‘mantle of science,’ it routinely ignores the findings of science. 
For example, it ignores the evidence for the highly specialised nature of human sense organs 
(sensory physiology), the constructive nature of perception, the complex relationship of 
experienced qualia to the energies described by physics (psychophysics), the ability of the 
brain to generate experiences in the absence of the physical energies that those experiences 
would normally represent (neuropsychology) and the many ways in which human perception 
differs from that of other animals (comparative psychology). In short, reductive physicalism 
ignores both the first-person phenomenological evidence regarding the nature of 
consciousness and the third-person evidence about how it relates to world described by 
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physics. It is ironic that a philosophy of mind intended to naturalise consciousness gives such 
an unnatural account of it.  
However, it is possible to develop a reflexive model of how consciousness relates to the 
brain and the physical world that is consistent with both third-person evidence of how the 
brain works and with first-person evidence of what it is like to have a given experience. 
Within this model the physical world as perceived (the phenomenal world) is viewed as part 
of conscious experience not apart from it. While in everyday life we treat this phenomenal 
world as if it is the "physical world", it is really just one biologically useful representation of 
what the world is like that may differ in many respects from the world described by physics. 
How the world as perceived relates to the world as described by physics can be investigated 
by normal science (e.g, through the study of sensory physiology, psychophysics and so on). 
While this is an entirely "natural" account of consciousness, it is nonreductive. That is, 
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